The E. Krupp, who has short gray hair and a Brooks Brothers look that announces his disdain for hemp-wearing environmental activists, had helped to educate McCain on climate change, and the two men became close. Now he wanted to do the same for Graham. He called Davis, who was an E. Graham came to the issue strictly as a dealmaker. But now Krupp explained the basics of global-warming science and policy: how carbon trading worked, how farmers could use offsets to earn an income from growing trees, and how different lobbyists would affect the debate.
Krupp told Graham that the crucial feature of the policy was the hard cap on emissions. The House bill required American carbon emissions to be seventeen per cent below levels by As long as that number held, environmentalists would show flexibility on most other issues. The dinner lasted three hours. The next day, Kerry, Graham, and Lieberman held their first meeting as the triumvirate that became known to everyone following the debate as K.
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Heckled at home, Graham began to enjoy a new life as a Beltway macher. In , he raised nothing from the electric-utility PACs and just fourteen thousand four hundred and fifty dollars from all PACs. In the first quarter of alone, the utilities sent him forty-nine thousand dollars.
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Krupp introduced Graham to donors in New York connected to the E. On December 7th, Julian Robertson, an E. Graham told colleagues that McCain had called him and yelled at him, incensed that he was stealing the maverick mantle. Other Republican colleagues taunted Graham. But Graham gave every indication to Lieberman and Kerry that he could deal with the pressure.
We have to move this along as quickly as possible. For Obama, health care had become the legislation that stuck to the wall. Where do you think the votes are? What do you think we should do? Lieberman and Graham believed it would send a clear message to Republicans and moderate Democrats that there were parts of the bill they would support. Graham asked Senator Lisa Murkowski, of Alaska, to write the drilling language. But he passed the Murkowski language on to his colleagues to see how they would react.
The K. One was to negotiate directly with them and offer them something specific for their support. After a year of that method, the coalition had one Republican, and its next most likely target wanted to drill in ANWR. Other Republicans were slipping away. He had been appointed by the Florida governor, Charlie Crist, who was then running in a tight Republican primary for the seat against another Tea Party favorite, Marco Rubio.
As for Olympia Snowe, the moderate Republican from Maine, who was known for stringing Democrats along for months with vague promises of joining their legislative efforts, she seemed to have a new demand every time Kerry, Graham, and Lieberman sat down with her. She also made it clear that granting her wishes—everything from exempting home heating oil from greenhouse-gas regulations and permanently protecting Georges Bank, a Maine fishery, from drilling—would not guarantee her support.
Another prospect was Susan Collins, the other Republican from Maine. She was the co-sponsor of a separate climate bill, with Maria Cantwell, a Democrat from Washington. Kerry, Graham, and Lieberman believed that the bill was unworkable and was stealing valuable attention from their effort. They spent months trying to figure out how to kill it and win over Collins. Then they would quietly swap it out as the legislation made its way to the Senate floor.
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Collins, however, never budged. If the oil companies and the nuclear industry and the utilities could be persuaded to support the legislation, then they would lobby Republicans. He sent his toughest political operatives—like Rahm Emanuel and Jim Messina—to cut deals with the pharmaceutical industry and hospitals, which at key points refrained from attacking the bill.
The pharmaceutical industry actually ran ads thanking Harry Reid for passing the bill. In early , K. Donohue, who has headed the Chamber since , had in that period helped kill several attempts to pass climate-change legislation. In most K. There were slight variations. But never did the variations depend on the person we were meeting with. Kerry asked Donohue if that was enough to get the Chamber to the table. It was a promising beginning. The Chamber was allowed to write the language of its top ask into the bill. It turned out that working with Washington interest groups was far simpler than dealing with Republican senators navigating a populist conservative uprising.
Three weeks later, Kerry and some aides were in his office discussing the progress of their bill. Someone mentioned T. Boone Pickens, the author of the so-called Pickens Plan, an energy-independence proposal centered on enormous government subsidies for natural gas, which is abundant, cleaner-burning than other fossil fuels, and sold by a Pickens-controlled corporation at some two hundred natural-gas fuelling stations across North America.
Back in , Pickens had helped to fund the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, a group that ran a sleazy—and inaccurate—ad campaign proclaiming, among other things, that Kerry had lied about the circumstances that led to his Bronze Star and Purple Hearts. Kerry had an inspiration.
Frangione was surprised. Kerry told an aide to get Pickens on the phone. Minutes later, Kerry was inviting Pickens to Washington to talk. Kerry walked Pickens through the components of the bill that he and his colleagues were writing, but Pickens seemed uninterested. He had just one request: include in the climate legislation parts of a bill that Pickens had written, called the Natural Gas Act, a series of tax incentives to encourage the use of natural-gas vehicles and the installation of natural-gas fuelling stations.
In exchange, Pickens would publicly endorse the bill. At the end of the meeting, the Senator shook hands with the man who had probably cost him the Presidency. Afterward, staffers in one of the K.http://1zoo.kh.ua/includes/2019-09-13/sebiv-pozdravleniya-devushke-s.php
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The hardest choices involved the oil industry, which, by powering our transportation, is responsible for almost a third of all carbon emissions in the U. Under Waxman-Markey, oil companies would have to buy government permission slips, known as allowances, to cover all the greenhouse gases emitted by cars, trucks, and other vehicles. Instead, three major oil refiners—Shell, B. On March 23rd, the three senators met to discuss the linked fee, which they had been arguing about for weeks. According to a person involved in the negotiations, Kerry told his colleagues that the Democrats might lose their congressional majority over the issue.
But Lieberman, who had first proposed the linked fee, and Graham supported it. Kerry, despite his hesitations, wanted the oil companies, which had already spent millions attacking Waxman-Markey, to support his bill. So the senators proposed a deal: the oil companies would get the policy they desired if they agreed to a ceasefire.
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Afterward, the industry could say whatever it wanted. They would not run ads, they would not lobby members of Congress, and they would not refer to our bill as a carbon tax. On March 31st, Obama announced that large portions of U. They are technologically very advanced. Republicans and the oil industry wanted more domestic drilling, and Obama had just given it to them. He seemed to be delivering on the grand bargain that his aides had talked about at the start of the Administration. But there had been no communication with the senators actually writing the bill, and they felt betrayed.
The group had dispensed with the idea of drilling in ANWR, but it was prepared to open up vast portions of the Gulf and the East Coast. Obama had now given away what the senators were planning to trade. This was the third time that the White House had blundered. Graham was also trying to use the promise of more loan guarantees to lure Republicans to the bill, but now the White House had simply handed the money over.
Later that month, a group of eight moderate Democrats sent the E. Again, that was a promise Kerry, Graham, and Lieberman wanted to negotiate with their colleagues. Obama had served the dessert before the children even promised to eat their spinach. Graham was the only Republican negotiating on the climate bill, and now he had virtually nothing left to take to his Republican colleagues. But the Administration had grown wary of cutting the kind of deals that the senators needed to pass cap-and-trade. The long and brutal health-care fight had caused a rift in the White House over legislative strategy.
We became the majority leader of both houses, and we ceded the Presidency. In early April, according to two K. After learning that, the three senators met with lobbyists for the big oil firms, and Kerry offered a new proposal: the refiners would have to buy permits, but the government would sell them at a stable price outside the regular trading system. This arrangement would make no economic difference to consumers: the oil companies would pass the costs on to drivers whether they paid a linked fee or bought special permits. But Kerry thought that the phraseology could determine whether the bill survived or died.
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The refiners surprised everyone by readily agreeing to the new terms. Two days later, on April 15th, Emanuel and Browner hosted a group of prominent environmentalists at the White House for an 11 A. For weeks, the linked fee had been a hot topic among Washington climate-change geeks. Now the two groups that hated the policy the most were in the same room. According to people at the meeting, the White House aides and some of the environmentalists, including Carl Pope, the chairman of the Sierra Club, expressed their contempt for the linked fee: even if it was a fine idea on the merits, it was political poison.